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Brooks v. State of Nevada, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. Citation 19 (April 3, 2008)
Criminal Law – Deadly Weapon Enhancement for Unarmed Offender
Summary
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery and
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon
Disposition/Outcome
Appellant James Brooks’ judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery and
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon is reversed and the matter is remanded to the district
court for a new trial. The district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury what it was required
to find to subject an unarmed offender to the deadly weapon enhancement. The district court
further erred in refusing to instruct the jury that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not
establish conspiracy.
Factual and Procedural History
On November 14, 2003, Christianne Davis arrived at her home and drove in the garage.
Davis left the garage door open and when she exited the vehicle, she was confronted by a man
with a gun standing in her garage. The armed man demanded Davis’s purse and she gave it to
him. The armed man exited the garage and ran towards a dark green Saturn near the driveway.
The armed man got into the car which then sped away. Davis observed the driver of the getaway
car, memorized the car’s license plate number and called 911.
The police officers that responded to Davis’s 911 call obtained the name and address of
the owner of the dark green Saturn. James Brooks appeared at the address driving the dark green
Saturn. He told police officers that he had possession of the car and no one else had driven
before leading police officers to a dumpster containing Davis’s purse.
Brooks was arrested and escorted to Clark County Detention Center. Brooks admitted to
driving the getaway car, but refused to identify the gunman. Davis arrived at Clark County
Detention Center shortly after Brooks’ apprehension and identified him as the driver of the
getaway car.
At trial, Brooks proffered a jury instruction that provided an unarmed offender is subject
to the deadly weapon enhancement only if he had knowledge that the armed offender was armed
and had the ability to exercise control over the weapon. The State offered a more general
instruction that an unarmed offender’s participation by aiding or abetting the armed offender in
the unlawful use of the weapon subjects the unarmed offender to the deadly weapon
enhancement. The district court accepted the State’s instruction and expressed doubt that the
State is required to prove that the unarmed offender had the ability to exercise control over the

weapon. The district court stated the focus should be whether the unarmed offender had
knowledge that a weapon would be used during the commission of the underlying offense.
Brooks also proffered an instruction advising the jury that absent an agreement to
cooperate in achieving a criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of
that purpose does not establish conspiracy. The district court refused to give the proffered jury
instruction.
A jury found Brooks guilty of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to
commit robbery. Brooks appealed the conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court. Brooks’ first
main challenge to his conviction is that the district court erroneously refused to give an
instruction offered by the defense regarding the circumstances in which an unarmed offender is
subject to a deadly weapon enhancement. The second main challenge is that the district court
erroneously refused to give an instruction that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not
establish conspiracy. Brooks also advanced multiple other challenges to his conviction that were
not addressed by the Court.
Discussion
A.

Deadly Weapon Instruction

The Court begins its analysis of the deadly weapon instruction by stating that the
constructive possession test in Brooks’ proffered instruction is an accurate statement of current
Nevada law. NRS 193.165(1) states that any person who “uses” a deadly weapon in the
commission of a crime is subject to a sentence enhancement. 1 The Court cites Anderson v.
State 2 for the proposition that an unarmed offender’s participation by aiding and abetting an
armed offender “in the unlawful use of the weapon, makes the [unarmed offender] equally
subject to the assed penalty inflicted upon defendants who commit crimes through the use of
deadly weapons.” The Court in Anderson set forth scenarios where an unarmed offender could
be subject to the sentence enhancement and the focus of the scenarios is on whether the unarmed
offender had knowledge of the use of the weapon and his criminal acts were facilitated by the
use of the weapon.
However, the Anderson Court went on to state that “the possession necessary to justify
statutory enhancement may be actual or constructive; it may exclusive or joint.” 3 Furthermore,
constructive possession for the purposes of the deadly weapon enhancement requires that “the
unarmed participant has knowledge of the other offender’s being armed and [has] the ability to
exercise control over” the weapon. 4 The Court noted two problems with the Anderson
constructive possession test. First, NRS 193.165(1) requires “use” of a deadly weapon in the
commission of an offense, not possession, so Anderson’s reliance on constructive possession was
outside the statute’s limits. Second, the control prong of the Anderson test can lead to absurd
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results depending on whether the unarmed offender could actually exert verbal or physical
control over the weapon. For these reasons the Court explicitly rejected the constructive
possession test in Anderson for the purposes of determining whether an unarmed offender is
subject to an enhanced sentence for an accomplice’s use of a deadly weapon.
The new test proffered by the Court is that to determine whether an unarmed offender is
subject to an enhanced sentence under NRS 193.165, the appropriate test is whether the unarmed
offender “used” the deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. An unarmed offender
“uses” a deadly weapon and is subject to a sentence enhancement when the unarmed offender is
liable as a principal for the offense that is sought to be enhanced. This occurs when another
principal to the offense is armed with and uses a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense
and the unarmed offender had knowledge of the deadly weapon.
The Court stated that the State presented evidence that Brooks drove the getaway car
during the robbery and knew the location of Davis’s purse. However, the State did not establish
that Brooks had knowledge of the other offender’s use of the gun. The Court instructed that the
State must prove that Brooks is liable as a principal for the robbery, that another principal to the
robbery was armed with and used a deadly weapon in the commission of the robbery, and that
Brooks had knowledge of the use of the deadly weapon. The Court then found that the district
court’s error was not harmless.
B.

Conspiracy Instruction

The Court stated that although the jury was instructed on conspiracy, “[a] positive
instruction as to the elements of the crime does not justify refusing a properly worded negatively
phrased “position” or “theory” instruction.” 5 Brooks presented the defense theory that he was
present at the robbery but did not know a robbery was going to take place and did not conspire to
commit it. The Court noted that there was little evidence in the record that Brooks conspired to
commit the robbery other than his presence at the scene of the crime. The Court held that
Crooks was entitled to the instruction that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not
establish conspiracy. It was accurate statement of law and the evidence presented at trial could
support his theory that he only learned of the robbery after it occurred. The Court ruled that this
was not harmless error because the jury may not have convicted Brooks of conspiracy to commit
robbery if it had heard his proffered instruction.
Conclusion
The Court clarified its test for determining when an unarmed offender is subject to a
deadly weapon enhancement and overruled the Anderson constructive possession test. The
Court held that the district court erred in refusing to give Brooks’ proffered jury instructions on
the deadly weapon sentence enhancement and conspiracy charge. The Court ruled that the
district court’s errors were not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Brooks judgment of
conviction and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial.
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